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Private pensions have grown rapidly during the past 30 years. Although 
there are elements of pensions that many plans share, there are also large 
differences across plans. The most obvious differences relate to the basic 
structure of  the pension benefit formula: the plan may be of the defined 
contribution or of the defined benefit type. In the latter category the flat 
or pattern plan can be distinguished from the formula or conventional 
plan. 
Economists often refer casually to the effects that changes in the benefit 
formulas have on worker behavior. Most frequently, these comments re- 
late to the effects of vesting on worker turnover. But as far as I am aware, 
no systematic attempt has been made to analyze the ways in which various 
provisions of  the pension benefit formulas influence worker behavior. ' 
This essay attempts to do just that. Specifically, it examines the effects of 
pension benefit provisions on worker turnover, labor supply, investment 
in human capital, and worker effort. Existing benefit formulas are com- 
pared with formulas that produce first-best results and an attempt is made 
to determine if and understand why provisions may deviate from those 
that produce efficient outcomes. In so doing, it is hoped that the under- 
standing of the existence of private pensions will be furthered. 
The paper examines a number of different pension institutions.  It ana- 
lyzes how worker productivity (as affected by turnover, investment in hu- 
man capital, and effort) is influenced by a change from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans and why pattern plans and conventional plans 
induce very different behavior. It also examines the effects of minimum 
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and maximum years of service requirements,  industrywide versus com- 
panywide plans, the relationship between hours-of-work constraints and 
pensions, why pensions are often related to final salary, and a number of 
other issues. For most of  the analysis, the pension rule is taken to be ex- 
ogenous so that the incentive effects of  that rule per se can be described. 
This is a less ambitious task than understanding why those rules exist and 
what other factors are involved. Occasionally some conjectures on the 
reasons for particular rules are presented, but that is not the primary pur- 
pose of the essay. The most important findings are summarized below. 
Pension benefit formulas cannot affect worker behavior or cause devi- 
ations from efficiency if each worker’s wage is directly and appropriately 
related to his own pension level. Without explicit offsets, the following re- 
sults obtain: 
Defined  benefit  pattern  plans  induce  an  efficient  allocation  of  re- 
sources. 
Defined benefit conventional plans induce too little turnover, too much 
work, too much effort, and too much human capital investment rela- 
tive to the efficient outcome. 
Defined contribution plans always induce an efficient allocation of re- 
sources. 
Complete and immediate vesting is a necessary condition for fully effi- 
cient pension plans. Incomplete vesting tends to result in too little work 
by some and too much by others. The standard intuition that pensions 
create longer job tenure on average is not necessarily correct. The ap- 
parent  inefficiency, but  widespread  existence, of  imperfectly  vested 
pension plans suggests that the sorting or retention of workers may be 
an important problem. 
Minimum  years of  service constraints create inefficiency in  pattern 
plans, whereas such constraints may actually reduce the inefficiency of 
conventional plans. Further, maximum years of service constraints tend 
to offset the inefficiency introduced by minimum years of service con- 
straints. 
The inefficiencies introduced by defined benefit conventional plans can 
be undone by specifying required effort levels. Thus, piece-rate work- 
ers, who choose their own effort levels, should not have defined benefit 
conventional plans. 
9.1  A Model 
The essence of  the relationship between benefit formulas and worker 
behavior can be analyzed in the context of a one-period model. Workers 
are paid some wage, W,  and are entitled to a pension, P,  which may,de- 
pend on years of service, salary, and a number of other rules having to do 255  Incentive Effects of Pensions 
with minimum and maximum age and years of service. In this one-period 
context, “years of service” is thought of simply as the number of years or 
hours, H, worked during the period so that a benefit formula that de- 
pends on years of service is one that has Has  an argument. 
Workers can control two variables: The amount of time worked, H,  is 
the labor supply variable and is affected by the worker’s alternative use of 
time function, L(H).  This reflects either the value of leisure or the wage 
on an alternative job, whichever is highest. In this way, we can analyze work- 
er turnover in this simple framework since there need be no formal dis- 
tinction between retirement and quitting to take another job (although the 
pension  flow may differ depending  on what the worker  does with his 
time). 
Both effort and investment in human capital are captured by the work- 
er’s  control over K, which affects worker productivity  and potentially 
the wage. No distinction is made in this model between effort and human 
capital, although some differences may be relevant.2 There is some cost 
associated with increasing K,  given by the total cost function C(K).  This 
carries either the interpretation of costs of  investment in human capital, 
in the form of formal schooling or on-the-job training that occurs before 
the current period, or the disutility value associated with additional effort. 
The reason Hand  Kmust be distinguished is that effort or investment in 
human capital affects pensions differently than years of  service. All de- 
fined benefit plans depend on years of service, but only some depend on 
salary as well. Effort and human capital investment are likely to affect sal- 
ary directly, years of  service only indirectly. 
The approach does not build in any explicit reason for the existence of 
pensions, although a number have been given in the literature.’ Instead, 
the reverse strategy is adopted. The effects of  various provisions are ana- 
lyzed in hope of obtaining clues to the reasons for their existence. 
Given the two  choice variables,  it is  trivial  to write down the effi- 
ciency conditions for labor supply, H,  and effort or human capital, K. 
The value of K in increasing output is normalized to be $1 and the work- 
er’s productivity at K = 0 is Vper unit of time. Thus, the worker’s output 
is (V + K)Hand the efficiency criterion is derived by maximization of so- 
cial benefit minus social cost or, under separability, by 
(1)  max (V + K)H -  C(K) -  L(H). 
H,K 
The first-order conditions for efficiency are 
(19  H = C’(K) 
and 
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Whether the worker behaves in such a way as to insure efficiency de- 
pends on his own utility maximization. Additionally, since firms wish to 
maximize profits, it is necessary to look to the interaction between the two 
in order to derive implications for changes in the pension plan. 
For generality, allow that the worker’s choice of K and H can affect 
both Wand P. Then the worker’s problem is 
(2) 
which yields, as first-order conditions, 




a/aK = (a w/aK)H + aP/aK -  C~K)  = o 
a/a~  = (a w/aH)H + w + awaH -  L~H)  = 0. 
and 
What makes the issue less than straightforward is the fact that pay- 
ments that take the form of a pension must be offset by a decrease in the 
wage rate. This is the result of the firm’s zero profit constraint, which is 
(3)  (V+K)H= WH+P, 
W=V+K-P/H  or 
Equation (3) says that total payments to the worker must equal total out- 
put by the worker. 
The way in which the worker perceives that his wage is affected by his 
pension is important. Although it is true that (3) must hold for all work- 
ers, it is not necessary that the worker’s wage respond directly to his own 
pension level. For example, a wage could be “fixed” and the worker could 
be allowed to choose his pension by altering H,  but these actions would 
not affect Was he perceives it. Although it is true that for all workers (3) 
must hold, any one worker’s effect on W may be regarded as trivial or 
zero. 
First consider the opposite situation, where the worker recognizes that 
any increase in P that is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in 
productivity must result in a lower wage. (This would be true in a one- 
worker firm.) The result is that the provisions of the pension plan cannot 
affect behavior. There is never a deviation from first-best efficiency. The 
reason is that the worker internalizes the full extent of his actions, no mat- 
ter how inefficient the pension formula may appear. This is trivial to show 
formally: 
If the worker recognizes that (3) holds, then his maximization problem 
from (2) becomes 
(4) 
max(V + K -  P/H)H + P - C(K) -  L(H) 
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max (V  + K)H - C(K) -  L(H), 
H,K 
which is the same as (1). The first-order condition 
namely, 
or 
ap  ap  -=H--  a  + -  -  C’(K)  = 
aK  aK  aK 
must be the same, 
0, 
or 
H = C’(K),  and 
(4ii)  -=V+K---+--  ap  L’(H)=  0,  a 
aH  aH  aH 
or 
V+  K = L‘(H). 
Equations (4i)-(4ii) are identical to (li)-(lii), so the worker chooses (H, 
K)  so as to guarantee first-best efficiency, irrespective of the pension bene- 
fit formula. Any action the worker takes that affects his pension also af- 
fects his wage in the opposite direction and by a corresponding amount. If 
the worker is fully aware of this, then all pension changes are offset and 
internalized, no matter how bizarre the pension formula. It is the worker’s 
recognition that things must add up on the firm side of the problem that 
forces him to behave efficiently. 
There is another way to state the same proposition: Distortions caused 
by the pension can always be undone by a judiciously chosen wage func- 
tion. As long as 
W(K,  H)  V + K -  P(K,  H)/H, 
for all K, H, the worker’s behavior cannot be affected by the pension. 
Whatever effect K and H have to increase Pis  exactly offset by a reduction 
in W( ). As long as the worker understands this relationship, pension ef- 
fects wash out. 
Then how  can  pension  formulas affect behavior?  In a multiworker 
firm, it may well be that the individual’s wage is not a direct function of 
his own pension benefits, even though all must add up across workers. 
This has nothing to do with worker heterogeneity but is the result of an ex- 
ternality that is produced by separating the wage determination process 
from the pension  determination process at the level of  the individual 
worker. Two points are worth noting: First, there is no obvious reason the 
firm does not make the worker explicitly aware of the true relationship be- 
tween P and W.  This is explored below. Second, a difference between the 
defined benefit  and  defined  contribution  plans  may be that  the latter 258  Edward P. Lazear 
makes explicit the relationship between P and W whereas the former does 
not. This too is discussed below. 
Those points aside, consider the worker’s problem when P/N is set so 
that in equilibrium P/H = V + K -  P(H*,  K*)/H* where H*,  K*  are the 
result of  the worker’s maximization problem, which takes P/H as con- 
stant. This insures zero profits, but the worker does not take that condi- 
tion into account in choosing H,  K.  For most of what follows, it is useful 
to recognize that pension benefit formulas rarely depend on K dire~tly,~ 
but instead depend on K indirectly through  W.  Therefore let P = P( W, 
H)  for the remainder. Further, suppose for simplicity that W is indepen- 
dent of H. If workers take P/H as given, then the worker’s maximization 
problem is 
max W(K)H  + P( W,  H) -  L(H) -  C(K), 
H,K  (5) 
whereS 
- 
W(K)  = I/ + K -  P/H. 
The first-order conditions are 
(5ii) 
--  a  -H+--  C’(K)  = 0 
aK  aw 
- 
L’(H)=O.  a  -=  V+K-(P/H)+-- 
aH  aH 
The difference between (5i)-(5ii) and (4i)-(4ii) is that in (4) the individ- 
ual recognizes that increases in P are offset by decreases in W.  In (5) W is 
unaffected, as far as the individual worker is concerned, by changes in P. 
Even if the worker does not take into account the effect of  pension on 
wage, it is not necessarily the case that pensions result in an inefficient al- 
location of effort, human capital, turnover, and leisure. This is easily seen 
by examining the maximization problem in (2). In order for efficient out- 
comes to result, it is sufficient that (29 reduce to (li) and (2ii) to (lii). The 
first condition is met if and only if 
ap  a”) 
-=H(l-  aK  aK 
and the second condition is met if and only if 
-=V+K-W-H-.  ap  aw 
aH  aH 
Any pension-wage relationship that the worker perceives as satisfying 
When the worker internalizes the firm’s side of the problem, he knows 
(6a) and (6b) induces an efficient allocation of resources. 
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P = (V + K - W)H. 
Differentiating  (3) yields 
__  ap  = H(  1 - c) 
aK  aK 
so that (6a) is satisfied and 
ap  aw  -=V+K-W-H- 
aH  aH 
so that (6b) holds. Thus, internalization of (3) results in full efficiency. 
9.2  Some Implications 
9.2.1  Pattern Plans 
Although complete internalization is sufficient for efficiency, it is not 
necessary. The standard defined benefit pattern plan, where the pension 
depends only on years of service and not salary, induces an efficient allo- 
cation of resources. That pension takes the form 
P = PH, 
where  is a fixed dollar amount and His chosen by the worker. Under 
those circumstances, and retaining the assumption that W =  V + K - 
P/H, a W/aK = 1 and aP/aK = 0 so that (29 becomes 
(70  H - C’(K)  = 0. 
Also, a W/aH = 0 and aP/aH = p so (2ii) becomes 
(7ii)  W+ -  L’(H)  = 0 
or 
since 
V+  K -  L’(H)  = 0 
W=  V + K -  P/H 
=V+K-p. 
Thus, (7i) and (7ii) are identical to (1i)-(lii), so efficiency is achieved. 
Stated alternatively, since aP/aK  = 0 and a W/aK =  1, (6a) holds. 
Also, since aP/aH = p, a W/aH = 0,  and W = V + K -  p, (6b) reduces 
to  fl = p and holds as well. 
This yields the conclusion that all standard pattern plans are efficient. 
The reason is that even though the worker does not explicitly take into ac- 260  Edward P.  Lazear 
count that his wage is reduced by an amount corresponding to pension 
size, he does implicitly. Since the increase in pension value is a function 
only of time worked, as is earnings, all is implicitly internalized. The 
worker’s “true” annual wage is W + aP/aH. When the pension formula 






so the worker’s true wage, as he sees it, is equal to his value to the firm. 
Thus, all is efficient. 
9.2.2  Conventional Plans 
The conventional defined benefit plan, where the pension benefit de- 
pends on some salary average times a factor times years worked does not 
result in an efficient allocation of resources if the worker does not take (3) 
into account explicitly. This can easily be shown: 






W=  V+K-P/H. 
(The worker takes P/H as given at P/H  and W is independent of H.) 
Thus, aP/aK = YH,  but a w/aK = 1  SO YH  + ~(1  -  a w/aK)  unless y = 
0 and (6a) is violated.  However, aP/aH  = yW and  V + K - W - 
H(a  W/tlH)  = y  W since a W/aH = 0 and W = (V  + K)/(1 + y) because 
P/H = y W.  Thus, (6b) holds. 
Thus, (2i) does not become (li) even though (2ii) does become (lii) for 
conventional plans. Explicitly, for the conventional plan, first-order con- 
ditions are 




H = Ct(K)/(1 + y) 
v  + K -  yw + yw -  L’(H)  = 0 
K=  L’(H)  - v. 
If the conventional plan results in inefficient effort and labor supply, 
which way do the effects go? The answer can be easily seen in figure 9.1. 
First-order conditions (li) and (lii) are shown by the solid lines, and (89 is 
shown by the dotted line. (Recall that [8ii] is identical to [lii].) Point Q is 
the solution to (1i)-(lii) and also to (7i)-(7ii) corresponding to the pattern 
plan since pattern plans are efficient. Point R is the solution to (8i)-(8ii). 
Since y  > 0, the line corresponding to (8i) must lie below that to (li) which 
implies that Hc > H* and that Kc >  K*.  There is too much investment in 
human capital and effort and too much labor supply with too little turn- 
over. 
Thus, the simplest form of  pattern plan provides incentives for an effi- 
cient allocation  of  resources, whereas the standard conventional plan 
does not. This suggests that conventional plans will also carry other provi- 
sions that seek to undo the inefficiencies inherent in these plans. Hours 
constraints, maximum and minimum numbers of years of service, and 
other restrictions can be imposed to restore some of  the lost efficiency, 
and these are explored in a later section. 
(8ii) 
or 
K*  KC  K 
H 
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It is interesting to perform some comparative statics to predict when in- 
efficiencies will be most pronounced. 
The most obvious relationship is that inefficiency is increased the larger 
is  y.  Since the current specification of the conventional plan is  a one- 
parameter one, this simply says that the inefficiency is increased the larger 
is the pension for any given number of hours worked and wage level. This 
is hardly surprising since if y were zero, there would be no pension and no 
inefficiency. Given the shapes of  the functions, however, an increase in y 
causes more inefficiency increase in K than it does in H. 
The inefficiency is greater when the value of raw labor, V,  is large. Me- 
chanically, this is because the K = L  ’  (H)  - Vfunction shifts to  the north- 
west. Intuitively, it is because the higher is  K the larger is the number of 
hours worked, even when all is efficient. Thus, the absolute size of the in- 
efficiency increases with  V. This is more than a neutral change in units, 
however, because the C(K)  function is not permitted to change simulta- 
neously. 
Contrast this with the effect of  a steepening of the cost function de- 
scribed by an increase in C’  (K)  at every K.  This has the interpretation of 
an increase in the disutility of effort or an increase in the cost of improving 
skills. The effect is similar to  a decrease in y. It reduces the size of the inef- 
ficiency, and does so to a greater extent for K (effort and human capital) 
than for H. The intuition here seems straightforward. Steepening the cost 
function dampens the inefficiency effect because it makes it more costly to 
behave in an opportunistic fashion. 
The story is analogous for the disutility of hours worked function. An 
increase in L ’  (H)  for all H flattens the K function and results in a reduc- 
tion in both Kand H.  The reduction, however, is proportional so that only 
the absolute size of the inefficiency decreases. 
An obvious question is, Why are conventional plans widespread if they 
introduce inefficiency? There are a few possible answers. 
First, everything said has been in terms of real wages rather than nomi- 
nal ones. A conventional  plan that bases the pension on the final few 
years’ salary indexes benefits to inflation. But even in an inflationary en- 
vironment, the same potential for distortion of too large H and K exists. 
Further, pattern plans are often indexed to inflation, although usually on 
an ad hoc basis. All that is necessary is that P, the dollar amount per year 
of service, be adjusted to the CPI or another easily obtainable index. 
There are other possibilities. It has been assumed throughout that the 
wage takes the form 
W=V+K-P/H. 
As mentioned at the outset, it is always possible to undo the distortion 
introduced by the pension by changing the wage function in a correspond- 
ing fashion. But in this case the way by which the wage function changes 263  Incentive Effects of Pensions 
to restore optimality is of particular interest because it implies a direct re- 
lationship among wages, human capital, and the pension formula. 
It turns out that the efficient wage function that also guarantees zero 
profit is 
w=  (L)(V+K). 
1+r 
That efficiency is guaranteed is easily seen. Equation (6a) becomes 
or 
Y=Y 
l+y  l+y 
and (6b) becomes 
yW= V+K-  W 
W(1  + y) = v+  K 
w=  (--)(V+K).  1 
l+Y 
Since both (6a) and (6b) are true, efficiency is guaranteed. Further, since 
W + P/H = W(l + y) 
and since W =  [  1/1 + y]  (V + K),  W + P/H = V + Kso  zero profits 
are guaranteed. 
Thus, W =  [1/1 + y]  (V + K)  is the efficiency-inducing wage to 
couple with conventional defined benefit plans. This is a specific example 
of the earlier statement that setting 
WE  V+K-  P(W,H)/H 
always insures efficiency. In this case, that identity holds when W = (111 
This produces an implication. The efficient wage function for a pattern 
+ 7)  (V  + K). 
plan is 
and 
w=  V+K-/3 
W=  (-)(V+K)  1 
l+Y 
for a conventional  plan so that, other things equal, wages should rise 
more rapidly with K for pattern plan workers than for conventional plan 264  Edward P.  Lazear 
workers. As a corollary, conventional plans with large values of y should 
reward effort and human capital less well. 
These implications are somewhat difficult to  test because K is not easily 
observed. However, since K reflects human capital investment as well as 
effort, one possibility is to examine the effect of  schooling and experience 
on wages. If wages and pensions are set to induce efficiency, then workers 
on jobs with conventional plans with high y’s should have the lowest ef- 
fect of schooling and experience on earnings. This will be tested in subse- 
quent work. 
Again, no rationale for setting up conventional, as opposed to pattern, 
plans is built into the analysis. The obvious explanation is that making the 
pension a function of salary allows one formula to be used for many dif- 
ferent  worker  types.  But  most  companies distinguish  between  worker 
types anyway, assigning conventional plans to white-collar workers and 
pattern plans to blue-collar workers. Many make finer distinctions. Tying 
pension to wage in order to conserve on paper seems to be a weak explana- 
tion. 
The argument that pensions are linked to wages for incentive reasons is 
not correct. There are two related reasons. First, the wage itself is suffi- 
cient to provide the appropriate incentives. Second, too much incentive is 
generated by tying pension to wage. That was the first result of  this sec- 
tion. More subtle explanations are required. 
9.2.3  Defined Contribution Plans 
What has been shown so far is that conventional defined benefit plans 
result in inefficiencies  when the worker’s wage is not adjusted to his own 
pension receipt.  With defined contribution plans,  what the worker  re- 
ceives is equal (in an actuarial sense) to what he contributes. Thus, defined 
contribution  plans cannot introduce inefficiencies, irrespective of  their 
provisions. This is simply a trivial restatement of the proposition that if 
the worker takes into account that his wage offsets any pension benefits 
received, he will always internalize the full effects of the pension and be- 
have efficiently.  Writing this down rigorously, note that with the defined 
contribution pension plan, the contribution per period of time, G( W,  H), 
times the length of working life, H,  must equal the received pension bene- 
fit, P( W,  H). 
In the absence of pensions, the wage must be set equal to V + Kin order 
to achieve efficiency. This follows directly from necessary condition (6b) 
because in the absence of a pension, aP/aH = 0. 
Thus, start by setting W = V + K  and then introduce a defined contri- 
bution plan that taxes G(  W,  H)  per H  worked. The worker’s problem is 
then 
max H[ W -  G(  W,  H)]  + P( W,  H)  -  C(K) -  L(H). 
H,K  (9) 265  Incentive Effects of Pensions 
But since the rules of the plan imply that P( W,  H)  = HG( W,  H),  (9) be- 
comes 
max WH - C(K) -  L(H) 
H,K 
or 
max (V + K)H -  C(K) -  L(H). 
H,K 
This is identical to (1) so that efficiency is guaranteed. The first-order con- 
ditions are 
(9ii) 
a  - awH- C’(K)=O 
aK  aK 
--  a  - W-L’(H)=O. 
aH 
Since a W/aK = 1, (9i) reduces to (li). Further since P = [G(  W,  H)]H,  W 
= V + Kfrom (3). Since P/N = G,  (9ii) reduces to (lii). 
Thus, defined contribution plans are always efficient without  any re- 
quired  additional  constraints.  This suggests that  defined  contribution 
plans should be more prevalent in situations where the inefficiencies asso- 
ciated  with  the  conventional  defined contribution  plan  are most  pro- 
nounced. Using the comparative statics results generated above, defined 
contribution plans should be used over conventional plans when pensions 
are relatively large (y causes greater inefficiency), when investment in hu- 
man capital is high-C(K)  function is flat-and  when hours worked are 
large-L(H)  function is flat. This suggests the use of defined contribution 
plans for high-wage, highly skilled workers.’ 
9.3  Vesting 
In order to consider the effects of  vesting, it is necessary to allow for 
some workers to leave before the vesting date and others to stay beyond 
that date. The easiest way to do this is to allow for two types of individ- 
uals: the first type has alternative use of time function L(H)  and the sec- 
ond has alternative use of time function L(H)  such that L(H)  > L(H)  for 
all H.  Let X of the population be of the first type and (1 -  A) be of the sec- 
ond type. 
A full and immediate vesting pension of the pattern plan type is always 
efficient. This simply requires duplication of the analysis in section 9.2.1 
above for the two types of workers because implicit in that analysis was 
the assumption that pensions vest immediately. The first-order conditions 
of the worker’s maximization problem are 
H = C’(K) 
V+  K -  /3  + /3  = L’(H) 266  Edward P.  Lazear 
for the first type and 
rl = C’(K) 
v  + K -  p + p = L ’ (A) 
for the second type. 
Now consider the same pattern plans without vesting. The simplest 
form of  nonvesting is to assume that  = 0 if H  < R.  There are three 
cases: First, H < nand  I?  < R.  This is the same as no pension since P/H 
= 0, and so there is full efficiency. Second, H > R and A > R.  This is 
the case just analyzed as fully vested pension benefits, and it yields effi- 
ciency as well. The only interesting case arises when H < R,  A 2 R or 
whenH?n,A<z. 
The important feature is that there is subsidization of the stayers by the 
leavers and this causes a distortion. The wage paid to workers must be suf- 
ficiently low to cover the pension costs to X  of the population who are 
stayers. Thus, the zero profit condition is 
(3’)  h(WH+ pH) + (1 -  h)WA= (V+  K)[XHi  (1 - X)m 
or 
W=V+K-  M 
A‘  x + (1 -  A)- H 
Now, the maximization problem for the stayers is 
(10’)  K,H 
maxH {v+K-  xp  [  x + (1 -  A) $1 
+ pH -  C(K) -  L(H) 
where asterisks denote equilibrium values. The first-order conditions are 




(lo’ii) -  a  -  - V+K+  (l-A)P  -L’(H)=O* 
R*  h + (1 -  A)- H* 
aH 
Similarly, for leavers, 
maxA [v+  R 
(10’)  R,A 
since A < R so pension 
-  M  1- C(R) -  L(A), 
(A+(l-h)g) 




\--  --I  - 
(1n'ii)  -  a  = V+  K -  hP  -  P(H)  = 0. 
H*  h + (1 -  X)- H* 
The situation is shown in figure 9.2. 
Points Q and Q are the efficient points for movers and stayers, respec- 
tively, and are obtained in the absence of a pension. Note that H > Aand 
K > I?  because L '  (H) > Lf  (H) for all H. 
In the presence of the pension that does not vest immediately, (1O'i) and 
(lb'i) are identical to (li), but (lo'ii) and (lb'ii) shift as shown in figure 
9.2. Thus, the new equilibrium points are R and R" for movers and stayers. 
The most important result is that both Hand  K deviate from the effi- 
cient levels. Stayers spend too much time on the job and invest in too 
much  human capital and effort because the marginal return to a year 
worked, 
P(1 - 
g* '  V+K+ 
A+  (1  -A)-  H* 
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exceeds the true value of work, V + K.  Similarly, leavers leave too early 
and do not invest in enough human capital and effort because the mar- 
ginal return to a year worked, 
g* ’ 
V+R-  hP 
h + (1 -  h)-  H* 
is less than the true value of work, V + x. 
A few additional points are in order. First, average tenure in the economy 
may rise or fall with the addition of  an imperfect vesting provision. Al- 
though average tenure rises for those who eventually receive a pension, 
average tenure falls for those who do not. The effect on the average for 
the economy as a whole depends on the proportion of  people in each 
group and on the increase and decrease for the respective groups, which 
depends in turn on the slopes of L(H)  and z(H).  But it is indeed quite pos- 
sible that average tenure falls as the result of vesting. 
Second, although it has not been my approach in this analysis to deter- 
mine why or whether particular provisions exist in long-run equilibrium, 
ignoring those issues is  especially bothersome here. In particular, since 
leavers subsidize stayers, one would expect some firms to cater only to 
leavers, offering no pension and paying wage W =  V + K.  This type of 
self-sorting, akin to Salop and Salop (1976), causes the non-fully vested 
pension equilibrium to become efficient. The reason is that firms that of- 
fer pensions obtain only stayers: Thus h = 1 and (lo’ii)  become identical 
with (lii).* 
A sorting equilibrium is  not  established if  workers do not  know to 
which class they belong before joining the firm. Of course, as is the case 
with any of these apparent distortions, a firm that offered compensation 
that induced efficiency could provide higher average wealth to the work- 
ers and should attract the entire labor force. So full and immediate vesting 
should dominate. But if L(H)  is positively sloped, then some specificity to 
the firm-worker relationship is implied. Sorting is particularly important 
when there exist substantial hiring costs or large amounts of firm-specific 
capital. Still, there is no obvious reason why a pension is used instead of 
deferred  compensation  that  takes  the  form  of  steeply rising  tenure- 
earnings profiles. 
These deeper issues aside, plans that do not vest immediately introduce 
distortions. Thus, other things constant, fully vested plans are more effi- 
cient, which implies that plans should be organized at the industry or, bet- 
ter, national level to eliminate such distortions. The fact that they are not 
suggests that some other issue, and the sorting of workers is a logical can- 
didate, raises important problems with which labor markets must grapple. 
The analysis for conventional plans is similar, has the same implica- 
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9.4  Minimum Benefit Levels 
A number of plans have minimum benefit levels below which pension 
payments are not permitted to fall. These provisions are almost exclusively a 
characteristic of conventional defined benefit plans. It might be thought 
that this lump sum feature of the plan is a way by which the inefficiency 
associated with conventional plans is eliminated. This is not the case. 
A conventional plan with a minimum level of benefits takes the form P 
= y  WH, for P > _PI P = _P otherwise .  Efficiency requires that (6a) and 
(6b) hold. When P < E,  then (6a) holds because aP/aK = 0. But (6b) is 
violated because aP/aH = 0, and  _P > 0 implies that W < V + K. 
If the equilibrium were such that P > 8,  then (6a) implies that 
yH=  H(l - 1) 
=o. 
This can only hold if y = 0, that is, if there is no pension so efficiency is 
not achieved here either. Therefore, the addition of a minimum benefit 
level cannot restore efficiency. 
9.5  Minimum and Maximum Years of Service for Pension Accrual 
Some plans have minimum service requirements. Pension benefits do 
not accrue for years worked less than, say, five so that a typical pattern 
plan formula is P = P(H -  HJ, for H > H, P = 0 otherwise. Others have 
maximum years of service allowances so that the pension formula is P = 
OH, for H < R,  P = OR  otherwise. Some plans have both. This section 
examines the effects of  these constraints on behavior. The generalized 
pattern plan takes the form P = 0, for H < H, P = P(H -  HJ, for _H < 
H < R,  P = /3(R  -  HJ, for H > w.  The generalized conventional plan is 
P = y(H -  HJ  W,  forH< H < R,  P = y(R  -  HJW, for H > R,  P = 0 
forH<H. 
The result is that if the equilibrium level of hours, H,  exceeds R then 
there is too little K and Hrelative to the efficient amount. If H < H < R, 
then there is too much K, H. If H <  _H,  then all is efficient. 
The analysis is most straightforward for pattern or flat benefit plans. 
Here, (2i) remains as in the efficient case (li), H - C’(K)  = 0, but (2ii) 
becomes 
(2iia)  K = L’(H) - V,  H < @, 
K=L‘(H)- V-P-H H<H<R; 
H  ’- 
(2iib) 
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Again a graph helps to understand the solution. Q denotes the efficient 
point in figure 9.3. 
If H < H,  then the constraint is binding for all workers and no one re- 
ceives pensions. The marginal value of hours in the creation of pension 
benefits and the average cost of  pension benefits is zero, so this reverts to 
the no pension case and all is efficient. 
If the relationships are such that the equilibrium has H < H < R,  then 
the relevant function is K = L'(H) - V -  @_H/H  and the equilibrium is 
at Fl.  Here, K1  > K*  and HI > H*, so there is too much effort, human 
capital, and labor supplied. The reason is that when R  > H  > ZY,  the 
marginal return to an additional year worked in increasing the pension is 
0. But the cost of the pension earned for only H -  Hyears is spread over 
all years H so that wage is reduced by less than the marginal value of pen- 
sion benefits. Thus, the net value of an additional hour worked is positive 
so workers overachieve, and overachievement depends directly on the lev- 
el of H. The larger is _H,  subject to H > H,  the larger is the inefficiency. 
The reverse is true when H > R.  Then the marginal pension value of an 
additional year of work is zero, but the cost of previous accruals is spread 
over all years so that W is reduced without an offsetting marginal benefit. 
Thus, workers underachieve. This is shown at F2  with HZ  < H* and Kz < 
K* . 
The analysis for conventional plans is similar but slightly more compli- 
cated. Here, (29 is altered as well, depending on the regime, since aP/a W 
is not generally equal to zero. Instead, 
(2ia')  H = C'(K),  H < _H; 
*I 
K,  K'  K, 
K 
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(2ib’) 
(2ic ’  ) 
H = [C’(K)  + y_H]/(l + y),H<  H c R; 
H=  C,(K),H>  R. 
Similarly, (2ii) becomes 
(2iia ’  )  K = L’(H) - V,  H < @, 
HW 
H 
(2iib ’  )  K = L’(H) - V - 2,  _H < H < R; 
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 graph the possibilities. 
Figure 9.4 illustrates the cases where H  < Nand H < H  < R.  Effi- 
ciency is shown at Q. If Ho  is sufficiently high so that H < Ho,  then Q is 
the equilibrium and all is efficient. No one works long enough to receive a 
pension so it drops out completely and all is efficient. 
in equilibrium, then the 
relevant conditions are (2ib’) and (2iib’). Equation (2ib’) is shown. But 
since Wis a function of H,  the exact shape of (2iib’) is unknown. Still, it is 
clear that (2iib’ ) lies to  the northwest of K = L ’  (H) - V.  Point C denotes 
If HI  is sufficiently low so that HI < H < 
H 
Ho 
in  case where 
HC  H 
H‘ 
in case where 
H<H<H 
K 
KO  K’ 
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the solution to the standard conventional plan with H  > H*, K > K*. 
The solution with H > 0 occurs at D.  D  can lie almost anywhere with re- 
spect to Q and C,  so nothing can be said about the efficiency of D  relative 
to C.  But it is clear that at D,  H > H* and K > K*  so the inefficiency is 
never eliminated. In the case of pattern plans, larger deviations of Hfrom 
zero make things worse for both H and K relative to the efficient values. 
This suggests the following empirical proposition: minimum years of ser- 
vice constraints should never be a feature of pattern plans but sometimes 
will make things better in a conventional plan and therefore may be part 
of conventional plans. 
Finally, in figure 9.5, if H > H then it must be the case that H c H*, K 
< K* because the equilibrium, E,  must lie to the southwest of the efficient 
point (since [2iic’J lies below K  = L’(H) - V). However, whether this is 
an improvement on the conventional plan solution at  Fis  ambiguous. It is 
clear that it reduces K and H,  but by too much. This implies that too little 
investment, effort, and work  occur because the marginal  incentives are 
too low as in the flat case. Further, the inefficiency worsens, the larger is 
R - H, so that the existence of a maximum years of service constraint, 
when binding,  should  be coupled with  minimum years of  service con- 
straints. 
9.6  Constraints on Work Time and Effort 
Suppose that “all-or-nothing”  contracts could be offered to workers. 
The general rule is that these contracts can always be made efficient be- 
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this context, this would amount to a contract that specified H = H*, K  = 
K*  and some lump sum payment.  Ignoring costs of monitoring and en- 
forcement, it is useful to ask whether, when, and what kind of constraints 
are desirable. In particular, it is interesting to consider when fixing H or K 
alone is sufficient to bring about efficiency. 
A general statement follows from examination of (2). Equation (29 re- 
duces to (li) (efficiency) if and only if (6a) holds. So when (6a) holds, even 
if (6b) is violated, fixing H = H* will result in full efficiency. The reason is 
that then the worker maximizes only with respect to  K and the solution to 
(29, given H  = H*, is K  = K*. The reverse is true if (6b) holds and (6a) 
does not. Then setting K  = K* eliminates (29 as a first-order condition 
and the solution to (2ii), given K = K*,  is H*. 
Equations (6a) and (6b) always hold for pattern plans. Therefore, there 
should be no constraints on years of service or investment and effort with 
pattern plans. One might then argue that mandatory retirement should be 
less prevalent for workers with pattern plans than for conventional plans. 
This is not a direct implication, however, because mandatory retirement 
refers to age rather than to years of service. 
Conventional plans satisfy (6b) but violate (6a). This implies that only 
constraints on K (and not H)  are required to bring about efficiency. Thus 
skill and effort levels are to be precisely specified for conventional plan 
workers. As the result, piece-rate workers who are allowed to select their 
effort levels should not have defined benefit conventional plans. 
9.7  Extensions of  the Model and Additional  Issues 
9.7.1  Multiple Wage Rates 
So far, wages have been constant over the lifetime. One question is, 
How does generalization to multiperiods with different wage rates in each 
affect the results? Specifically, in a two-period context, the pension can be 
paid for out of the wages from either period or from some combination of 
the two. The result is that no matter how it is done, as long as the worker 
recognizes that his wages depend on the pension through the zero profit 
constraint, or is forced to recognize it by an appropriate shift in the wage 
function, all is internalized and no inefficiency results. Tilting the age- 
earnings profile has no effect on behavior. This is easily seen. The work- 
er's problem is now 
(1  1) 
K,Hi,  H2 
max 
subject to 
WI HI  + Wsiz + P(H1, Hz,  WI, W2) -  C(K) -  L(H1,  H2) 
(3')  WiHi + W2H2  + P=  (V+  K)(W,  + Hz) 214  Edward P. Lazear 
and 
Wl  = V+  K-  BP/Hi,  W2  = V+  K -  (1 -  8)P/H2,  0 I0  I  1. 
First-order conditions are 
C‘(K)  = 0  a  ap 
-  = H~ -  e-  + H~ -  (1 -  e)-  + -  -  aK  aK  aK  aK 
(lli) 
-  a 
aH2  aH2  aH,  aH2  aH2 
= I/ + K -  8-  ap  -  (1 -  e) -  ap  + -  ap  - -  -0  - 
aL 
(1 1  iii) 
=V+K--=O. 
aH2 
Equations (lli), (1 lii), and (1 liii) are the two-period analogue of (li) and 
bring about efficiency. Thus, independent of the division of pension costs, 
that is, for any 8, as long as the worker is aware of the competitive firm’s 
response to his pension increase, all is internalized and efficient. 
This does not imply that pensions never distort incentives. If the work- 
er’s own wage does not adjust to his own pension, but rather to the aver- 
age pension on which he has only a trivial effect, then inefficiencies can re- 
sult as they do in the one-period case. More fundamentally, if the “true” 
wage, including the value of pension accrual and other perks, does not 
equal marginal product, and if the worker is allowed to choose his hours, 
then inefficiencies result. But this point, which is analyzed in more detail 
in Lazear (1  98 l), is quite independent of pensions and holds even when all 
compensation takes the form of a direct money wage. 
9.7.2  Corner Solutions 
It is useful to consider some special cases. First, consider the case where 
the H function, (29, and the K function, (2ii), do not intersect in the posi- 
tive quadrant. This can happen either because the L’(H)  function is too 
flat, reflecting a very low utility loss associated with forgone additional 
hours of  leisure, or because the C‘(K)  function is too flat, reflecting a 
very low marginal cost of effort or investment. Under such circumstances, 
time worked, effort, and human capital investment are infinite. It is clear 
that such a situation cannot occur if  for no other reason than that the 
L(H)  function becomes vertical (horizontal in the diagrams) when time 
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Second, it is possible that the L(H)  function is perfectly inelastic at W  = 
0. This means that the worker views work at this firm as so distasteful that 
he is unwilling to supply even one hour at any price. Then the intersection 
is at the origin, yielding the corner solution that H = 0 and K = 0. 
Third, the worker may view all jobs as identical, in which case the L(H) 
function is perfectly elastic at L(H)  equal to the market wage. This makes 
the K function a vertical line at (market wage - V). If this lies in the posi- 
tive quadrant, then equilibrium is at the interior intersection, because the 
worker’s value to this firm is sufficient to bid him away from rivals. In the 
case where that vertical line lies to the left of the vertical axis, no work oc- 
curs, because the worker’s marginal product,  V,  at this firm is insufficient 
to warrant employment given the market price of his services. If that line 
is coincident with the vertical axis, then all are indifferent because his mar- 
ginal product here is identical to the market wage so neither the worker nor 
firm has a preference over his work location. 
Finally, if  C’(K)  is positive for K  = 0, then a corner solution exists if 
L’(H)  is sufficiently steep (flat K function in the diagram) to avoid an in- 
tersection in the positive quadrant.  The interpretation is that the fixed 
cost of effort or investment is sufficiently high to discourage any work at 
this job. The solution is H = 0, K = 0. 
Incidentally, when comparing the solution, K has the interpretation of 
effort or human capital specific to this firm. Obviously, if a corner solu- 
tion is reached because, say,  Vis too low relative to the market wage, in- 
vestment in human capital and effort at the other firm is still possible. 
9.7.3  Maximum Age Restrictions 
A number of  plans have a maximum age of  starting employment such 
that workers who start after that age are not entitled to enrollment in the 
pension plan. This is quite aside from any issues of vesting which depend 
on years of service independent of age. Although no solid explanation of 
this phenomenon is presented, it is useful to consider the issues. 
The fact that firms do not want to put old workers of a given tenure to- 
gether with young workers of  given tenure suggests that old workers cost 
more in terms of pension payouts even holding years of service constant. 
The most obvious reason this is the case is that a worker who starts at age 
59 is likely to retire with fewer years of service than a worker who starts at, 
say, age 45. If defined benefit plans were set up in a way that subsidized re- 
tirees with fewer years of service, then it would be more costly to enroll 
older workers in a pension plan than younger workers. Elsewhere (Lazear 
1982, 1984) I have argued that it is efficient to set up pension plans the ac- 
tuarial value of which declines with increased years of service because of 
incentive and turnover effects. I also find empirical support for this prop- 
osition. This story seems to provide an explanation for age restrictions, 
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as well as experience? Such a provision would probably be illegal under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but this is a relatively recent 
constraint and it is not clear why it does not apply to the provision that de- 
nies pensions to older new hires. 
9.7.4  Individualized Wage-Pension Combinations 
The basic result,  that  pensions cannot  affect behavior  if  the corre- 
sponding wage adjustments are accounted for by the worker, leads to an 
obvious question: Is the wage set independent of the pension, and if  so, 
why? Why doesn’t the firm call out a wage-pension combination such that 
W =  I/ + K -  P(H,  K)/H,  so that the worker is forced to internalize ev- 
erything and to behave efficiently? 
The obvious answer is almost definitional. To do so makes the pension 
identical to wage payments and the pension might as well be eliminated al- 
together. The fact that wages and pensions are somewhat independent 
provides some clue as to why there are pensions in the first place. 
If pensions are part of  an optimal compensation scheme that attempts 
to deal with problems of  incentives and turnover (as argued in Lazear 
[1982]), then a pension that is independent of  the wage for the individual 
worker provides the extra degree of  freedom necessary to restore effi- 
ciency. Merely offering a higher wage does not provide the appropriate in- 
centives because of  the contingent nature of  pensions on performance. 
Pension “buyouts” of  relatively less productive workers are part of the 
optimal compensation scheme. 
The same is true if the pension functions as an insurance device, paying 
more to workers who live longer (or who live to the same age but retire 
earlier). Reducing the pension while at the same time increasing the wage 
defeats the usefulness of the pension as an insurance device. Allowing the 
worker to choose his wage-pension allocation results in the standard ad- 
verse selection problem and separating equilibrium issues discussed by 
Akerlov (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). 
The exception to this is the rationalization of pensions as a tax-free sav- 
ings acc~unt.~  If it were performing only this function, then allowing the 
worker to choose the combination of wage with pension would in no way 
negate the tax saving effects of a pension and would allow the individual 
to tailor the compensation to his individual situation. As the result, no ra- 
tionalization of  independent wage-pension provisions is provided by the 
tax argument. Further, if taxes were the issue, a defined contribution plan 
would win on almost every count. Yet defined benefit plans are prevalent. 
9.7.5  Plans That Are Not Actuarially Fair 
All of the analysis is conducted under the simplifying assumption that 
P(H,  K)  is some fixed payment rather than some annual flow, which more 
closely describes most pensions. If risk neutrality is assumed, the fact that 
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not essential. What is essential is that the interpretation of a pattern plan 
as one that has P depend on years of service in a linear fashion and a con- 
ventional plan as one that depends on some salary average and years of 
service in a linear fashion is not accurate. Aside from explicit nonlineari- 
ties built into the benefit formulas, there are implicit nonlinearities that 
have to do with when the worker retires. 
For example, in the pattern plan, it is the annual flow of pension bene- 
fits, not the expected present value of those benefits that increases at con- 
stant rate per year of service. For this to cause the present value of pension 
benefits to increase at a constant rate per year of  service, additional re- 
strictions having to do with life expectancy, discount factors, and rate of 
accrual are required. In reality, I have shown that the contrary is generally 
the case (Lazear 1982, 1984). Beyond a certain number of years of service, 
the present value of pension benefits actually declines with years of ser- 
vice. The same is true for conventional plans of the defined benefit type. 
In fact, in the case of conventional plans, the reduction in present value 
with years of service beyond a certain point may help to restore the effi- 
ciency that is lost when workers fail to account appropriately for the rela- 
tionship between wages and pensions. Since, in the absence of a decline, 
workers tend to  overinvest in human capital, to work too hard, and to put 
in too many hours and years of service, this decline may actually move the 
situation toward the first-best solution. 
Finally, it has been assumed throughout that the wage never exceeds the 
worker’s marginal product. If it does, then, as I have suggested elsewhere, 
seemingly inefficient pensions may actually bring about efficiency. 
9.8  Conclusion 
This paper creates as many questions as answers. The goal is to identify 
the incentive effects of  different pension provisions. In doing so, puzzles 
arise because many provisions appear to have adverse incentive effects. 
Although few of the puzzles are solved, some directions for empirical in- 
vestigation are suggested. In particular, the link between the wage rela- 
tionship and productivity variables bears a special correspondence to the 
pension plan. For example, one implication is that pattern plans should be 
coupled with wage  functions that reward increased effort more gener- 
ously than those coupled with conventional plans. Further, the incidence 
of maximum and minimum hours restrictions in pension plans is predict- 
ed, as well as the pattern of hours and effort requirements. 
Perhaps more important than the empirical implications of the model is 
the clarification of  the effects induced  by various  pension provisions. 
Many of  the effects are subtle in mechanism, although not necessarily in 
size. Few have been considered in the past, and this essay takes a first step 
toward the understanding of  these institutions that often seem either in- 
nocuous or arbitrary to the casual observer. 278  Edward P.  Lazear 
Notes 
1. Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1978), Burkhauser and Quinn  (1981), and Fields and 
Mitchell (1981) examine the effects on retirement behavior. Stiglitz (1975) considers vesting 
effects as well. 
2. For example, investment in human capital may be more easily observed than changes in 
the level of effort, because the former may require the use of the firm’s resources (e.g., other 
employees as teachers, etc.). 
3.  For example, some emphasize tax breaks enjoyed (Black 1980; Tepper 1981; Merton 
1982; Sharpe 1976; Bulow 1979, 1981), while others emphasize incentive and mobility effects 
(Miller andScholes 1979; Lazear 1979, 1982, 1983). 
4.  The exception is the split in benefit formula betwechite-  and blue-collar workers. 
5. This is a special case because W(K)  = V + K - P/H  implies that W’(K)  = 1. Addi- 
tional distortions and offsets can be introduced by choosing other W(K)  functions. But un- 
less the general condition that W(K,  H) = V + K -  P(K,  H)/H  holds, the deviation from 
first best remains. Only then can the firm break even and have conditions (2i) and (2ii) re- 
duce to(li)and(lii). 
6. In order to achieve an interior solution, it must be the case that the K function is flatter 
than the H function or that the disutility of labor hours (i.e., the value of leisure) rises more 
rapidly than the cost of  additional human capital or effort. Suppose it did not. Then the so- 
lution would be to continue to invest in K and keep working more and more hours. Even- 
tually, Happroaches maximum feasible hours, so L ‘(H)  must become infinite, guaranteeing 
an interior solution. 
7. This ignores differences that result from consideration of the reasons for pensions in 
the first place. This set of predictions is most consistent with the view that a pension serves as 
a tax-free savings account but neglects any explanation for pensions having to do  with incen- 
tives or separation efficiency. 
8. Asch (1983) explores this mechanism both at the theoretical level and empirically. 
9. SeeMillerandScholes(1979),  Bulow (1979,1981), Black (1980),Tepper (1981), Sharpe 
(1976), Merton (1982) for discussions. 
Comment  Roger H. Gordon 
In “Incentive Effects of Pensions,”  Lazear examines the incentive effects 
of various types of  pension plans on labor supply and human capital in- 
vestment. The analysis is clear and straightforward, and Lazear is careful 
to point out the testable implications of the theory. However, it is hard to 
know how much faith to put in the conclusions. In order to assess their 
plausibility, let me start by examining several of the key assumptions un- 
derlying the model. 
One basic assumption is that all decisions would  be made efficiently 
without pensions, so that any change in incentives caused by pensions cre- 
ates an efficiency loss. For example, when firms have a conventional pen- 
sion plan, which  Lazear argues creates inefficiencies, he then  forecasts 
that such firms would be likely to introduce modifications to their pension 
plans to lessen the resulting efficiency loss. 
Roger H. Gordon is associate professor of economics at the University of  Michigan and a 
research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 279  Incentive Effects of Pensions 
I find this basic approach surprising. My presumption would have been 
that there is likely to be something omitted from our models that leads 
firms to rationally behave as they do. The strategy of the paper would 
then be that an analysis of the incentives created by existing pension plans, 
and an examination of which firms adopt which style of pension, ought to 
suggest what these omitted factors are. Any omitted factors that lead 
firms to adopt “inefficient” plans might also lead them to introduce fur- 
ther seemingly inefficient characteristics into their pension plans, for ex- 
ample, delayed vesting. It seems premature to forecast that detailed char- 
acteristics of a plan would be designed to lessen an inefficiency whose very 
existence we  cannot yet  rationalize. This complaint is mostly about the 
tone of the paper and the conclusions drawn, rather than about the analy- 
sis itself. 
One further note about interpretation: within this paper, Lazear exam- 
ines the incentive effects of pensions per se. The implication again is that 
if  pensions were eliminated, the inefficiency would be eliminated as well. 
Yet  if  the firm intends to have the net compensation of a worker deviate 
from his marginal product in any period, then the deviation is not caused 
by the pension per se and presumably would not disappear if the pension 
were eliminated. Pensions may facilitate certain forms of  deviations, but 
other institutions may accomplish almost the same purpose. 
Another key modeling decision that Lazear had to make early in the pa- 
per was how to handle the fact that if the individual’s wage adjusts to fully 
offset any characteristics of the pension, then the pension plan will have 
no effects on behavior, and so is fully “efficient,” regardless of how pecu- 
liar it may appear. Lazear plausibly assumes that the wage-setting proce- 
dure is sufficiently separated from the pension plan that any one individ- 
ual’s  wage  will  not  necessarily  fully  reflect  the  value  of  his  pension 
accruals each period, even if on average it does (as required by competi- 
tion). In particular, he assumes that the individual expects his wage to sat- 
isfy 
- 
(1)  W=  V+K-P/H, 
where P/H = P(H*,  K*)/H*  is assumed by the individual to remain con- 
stant even when he changes his behavior. 
It is not clear from the discussion what motivates this particular specifi- 
cation.  Is it a description of  individual expectations, which may often 
prove to be incorrect? Or is it an accurate description of how any one indi- 
vidual’s wage responds to his own behavior? Given the strong presump- 
tion in the profession in favor of rational expectations, I will presume that 
the motivation  is the latter. But why  should we  presume that the firm 
chooses this particular time pattern of compensation? No empirical evi- 
dence supporting it is provided. 
I presume the intended justification for equation (1) is administrative 
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to behavior seems quite flexible. Many of the more highly trained individ- 
uals participating  in pension plans would have individually determined 
wages. Taking into account clearly specified time patterns of pension ac- 
cruals seems much easier than taking into account many of the other rel- 
evant factors. Even when wages are set for a group as a whole, the vari- 
ation in wage rates  necessary to offset the effects of  pensions is quite 
simple. For the conventional plan described in the paper, all that is needed 
is to set wages so that W = (V + K)/(  1 + y). Perhaps there is a reluctance 
to change wages sharply in response to such factors as vesting or mini- 
mum service requirements, though why is unclear. But this does not pre- 
vent wages from responding smoothly to other factors entering the pen- 
sion formula, such as years of  service. That the manager setting wages is 
distant from the pension plan is not a convincing response, as the general 
guidelines used for setting wages can reflect most of the effects of pension 
plans quite easily. Of course, wages may respond more easily to some ef- 
fects of pensions than to others, and the firm may desire that wages offset 
only certain of the effects created by the pension plan. The nature of  the 
remaining  “inefficiencies,” however,  may not be very similar to those 
found by Lazear when he assumes wage rates do not respond at all to the 
effects of pensions. 
An additional uncomfortable implication of equation (1) is that it is 
inconsistent  with  each  individual  receiving  in  compensation  over  his 
time with the firm the total value of  his marginal product. For if the indi- 
vidual always breaks even over his career,  his  wages  must  necessarily 
adjust at some point to changes in the value of  his pension-P/H  cannot 
remain constant. As long as individuals are heterogeneous, equation (1) 
implies interpersonal transfers-some  receive on average more than their 
marginal  product  and  others  receive  less.  If  these  transfers  become 
significant, then  competitive  pressures ought  to undermine  the situa- 
tion. 
Finally, if  administrative expedience is  the justification  for equation 
(l), why do firms adopt conventional pension plans, which generally are 
much more complicated to administer than the alternatives?  Handling 
vesting questions, mandatory retirement, the detailed definitions of fac- 
tors entering the pension formula, and inflationary readjustments in the 
formula itself, all seem to create far more administrative problems than 
running a plan like TIM-CREF. It would appear that factors other than 
administrative expedience are at issue in determining the design of pen- 
sion plans. 
Lazear does not consistently accept equation (l),  however. In modeling 
defined contribution  plans,  Lazear  assumes that the wage rate reflects 
pension contributions at each date, regardless of  how peculiar the time 
pattern of contributions. I find this puzzling. If the justification for equa- 
tion (1) is administrative expedience, is it that much easier to adjust wage 
rates for an explicit contribution than for an implicit contribution? Actu- 281  Incentive Effects of Pensions 
aria1 calculations are done anyway for ERISA, and rules of thumb would 
be expected to develop approximating the correct offset when the contri- 
bution is implicit. The distinction in the paper between conventional plans 
and defined contribution plans seems much too sharply drawn. 
So far I have confined my comments to the plausibility of the basic as- 
sumptions underlying the model. Let me comment briefly on the specific 
conclusions reached by the analysis: 
I. Firms with eficient conventional plans should have wage structures 
that reward schooling and experience less well than elsewhere, and least so 
among those with the largest pensions. This forecast is unassailable given 
the model. However, if  as in Lazear (1981) pensions are used to delay 
compensation so as to lessen agency problems, then it may well be that the 
wage structure would be designed to delay compensation as well, rather 
than to offset the delay built into the pension formula. Also, in imple- 
menting any test empirically, many complications would have to  be faced, 
such as the endogeneity of the characteristics of pension plans and the va- 
riety of time patterns of pension accruals. 
2. Defined contribution plans ought to be relatively more common for 
high-wage, highly skilled workers. Given the model, all that really follows 
is that conventional plans ought to be less likely in this setting, assuming 
that the first conclusion is false. (If the first conclusion is satisfied empiri- 
cally, then all the plans would be “efficient.”) Pattern plans, defined con- 
tribution plans, or no pension plan, are each efficient within the model. I 
have also argued above that it could as easily have followed within the 
framework of the model that defined contribution plans are “inefficient.” 
This forecast is not persuasive. 
3.  Only conventionalplans ought toplace restrictions on human capital 
oryears of service. This conclusion assumes both that the first conclusion 
is false, so that conventional plans are “inefficient,” and that there are no 
efficiency reasons to create a divergence between the time patterns of com- 
pensation and marginal products. If there are such omitted factors, they 
could affect the design of all types of pension plans. One basic question, 
though, is why firms which choose an inefficient form of pension when ef- 
ficient forms are available, then act to minimize the resulting efficiency 
loss when designing detailed characteristics of the pension. 
What, then, do we learn from the paper? The prime conclusion seems 
to be that in assessing the incentive effects of pensions, it is critical to ex- 
amine how wage rates adjust in response to pension provisions. This pa- 
per analyzes the effects of pensions when wage rates reflect only the aver- 
age pension accrual for the group covered by the plan, and not its time 
pattern. Many other assumptions could have been made, with very differ- 
ent implications. The most fruitful direction of research would seem to be 
to examine empirically the nature of  compensation schemes. Measuring 
the time pattern of marginal products, for comparison with the time pat- 
tern of compensation, will not be easy, however. 282  Edward P. Lazear 
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